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The African continent has made great strides in reducing the number of 
violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Simultaneously, however, 
the nature of security threats has substantially changed. This requires new 
regional and international responses to strengthening the security of Afri-
can citizens.
 • Insecurity is increasingly driven by the reoccurrence of conflicts in some coun-
tries rather than by the emergence of “new” ones. Decentralised forms of vio-
lence like terrorism, urban riots, and small insurgencies in state peripheries 
have been on the rise. Conflicts with strong regional and international involve-
ment have increased. 
 • These changes have been driven by (a), most notably, substantial but highly 
unequal economic growth in many African countries, (b) (incomplete) democ-
ratisation which is often coupled with weak state capacity and bad governance, 
and (c) various demographic factors, such as strong population growth, rapid 
urbanisation, and an increasing share of economically and socially deprived 
youth. Taken together, these factors have created grievances and opportunities 
for violence that have changed the nature of security threats in Africa.
 • African and international responses to these security challenges have been 
hampered by a predominant focus on dealing with ongoing violent conflicts 
rather than on their prevention and, even more so, post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Also, conflict management has mainly relied on military means at the expense 
of broader economic and political approaches that would address the underly-
ing socio-economic and political drivers. 
Policy Implications
The changed security conditions require an adapted response by both African 
and international actors. The international community could enhance its contri-
bution by promoting comprehensive peacebuilding strategies, clearly defining 
the roles and responsibilities of different actors, and strengthening the develop-
ment–security nexus. Such a reorientation would make African approaches and 
international support more effective in addressing the structural causes of inse-
curity on the African continent. 
Dr. Christian von Soest
Lead Research Fellow
christian.vonsoest@giga-hamburg.de
Dr. Alexander De Juan
Senior Research Fellow
alexander.dejuan@giga-hamburg.de
GIGA German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  
20354 Hamburg
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
   2    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 2 | MAY 2018 
A Changing Security Environment on the African Continent
Data on insecurity in Africa shows a relatively stable long-term trend that armed 
intra-state conflict [1] has been on the decline since the end of the Cold War. Simi-
larly, the number of people that have died in armed conflict on the African continent 
has substantially decreased. Simultaneously, economic, political, and demographic 
developments have fundamentally changed the nature of violence and insecurity. 
Four main trends must be taken into account in order to effectively counter current 
security threats in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Increasing conflict recurrence: Present-day violence in Africa is strongly driven 
by the recurrence of intra-state conflicts rather than by the emergence of entirely 
new violence. The number of “new” violent conflicts peaked in the 1990s and was 
subsequently surpassed by recurrent conflicts. Many countries that are engulfed in 
armed intra-state conflict today have previously experienced phases of instability 
and violence only interrupted by short intervals of relative peace (see Figure 1). 
Ongoing crises in South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic are current 
examples. Although similar trends can be observed globally, they are most pro-
nounced in Africa and the Middle East. Such so-called conflict traps blur the classic 
dividing lines between the clearly identifiable stages of conflict prevention, conflict 
management, and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Decentralised forms of violence, terrorism, and organised crime: While organised 
large-scale political violence over control of the state (armed intra-state conflict) 
has declined in frequency and intensity, current insecurity is strongly driven by 
more low-level insurgency in state peripheries (Straus 2012). Moreover, other 
mani festations of insecurity have gained in importance. As Figure 2 illustrates, ter-
rorist attacks (bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings) have increased signifi-
cantly since 2010, as have more decentralised forms of violence. According to data 
from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), riots and violent 
protests have witnessed the sharpest increase among all security-relevant events in 
Africa from 1997 to 2013 (Raleigh et al. 2010). Data on clandestine organised crime 
and drug trafficking is scarce, and we have little hard evidence on its impacts on 
socio-economic outcomes, including violence and security. Nevertheless, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that organised crime and the drugs trade exhibit strong negative 
effects on economies and political systems in highly affected countries like Mali, 
1 We rely on the widely 
used definition of “armed 
conflict” developed by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP): “An armed 
conflict is a contested 
incompatibility which con-
cerns government and/or 
territory where the use of 
armed force between two 
parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths.”
Figure 1 
Conflict Onset and 
Recurrence in Africa, 
1970–2015 (counts in 
five-year periods)
Source: Own illustra-
tion based on data 
provided by Gleditsch et 
al. (2002) and Allansson, 
Melander, and Themnér 
(2017).
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Guinea-Bissau, and Kenya; though the extent to which it constitutes a direct secur-
ity threat in sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. 
Transnationalisation: An increasing share of violent conflicts on the continent af-
fects multiple countries simultaneously. Since the turn of the century, the absolute 
and relative number of conflicts with strong international dimensions has increased 
substantially. As Figure 3 illustrates, over the last decade, the most recent upward 
trend in the prevalence of armed intra-state conflict has been driven by a steady 
increase in internal conflicts where other states intervene. Currently, 79 per cent 
of civil wars in Africa are characterised by cross-border violence, and 29 per cent 
of conflict actors operate across borders (Deltenre and Liégeois 2016). This can be 
explained by the increasing range of non-state and substate armed actors (militias, 
terrorist groups, small and peripheral rebel groups) that regularly cross borders, 
such as Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa. 
Regional differentiation: The types of security challenges have always varied across 
African regions and countries (and, of course, even within countries). Similarly, 
some of the current trends are geographically concentrated. For instance, the num-
ber of terrorist attacks has increased in almost all parts of the continent but has 
been particularly pronounced in eastern, western, and northern Africa; central and, 
in particular, southern Africa have been less affected. The increasing amount of 
violence perpetrated by political and communal militias is especially pronounced 
in eastern and central Africa. Meanwhile, several countries in southern Africa 
Figure 2 
Terrorist Attacks in 
Africa, 1992–2015
Source: Own illustra-
tion based on data pro-




Types of Armed 
Conflict in Africa, 
1989–2015
Source: Own illustra-
tion based on data 
provided by Gleditsch et 
al. (2002) and Allansson, 
Melander, and Themnér 
(2017).
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have recently seen comparatively large numbers of often violent demonstrations 
(Raleigh et al. 2010). 
Changing Drivers of Conflict and Violence in Africa 
The primary threats to peace and security in Africa are well known: poverty, weak 
state institutions, and weak governance. Nonetheless, specific economic, politi-
cal, and demographic developments have contributed to the observable changes of 
symptoms of violence and insecurity. 
Despite relative improvements in a lot of states, the absolute prevalence of pov-
erty and economic inequality has increased in many African countries. This consti-
tutes a risk for intra-state conflict and potentially induces more decentralised forms 
of violence. Many African countries have experienced high and steady economic 
growth in recent years, which has led to a substantive decline in poverty rates across 
the continent. However, as a consequence of pronounced population growth, the 
absolute number of poor people has increased. Moreover, the benefits of growth are 
often distributed in a highly unequal way. In fact, Africa as a whole has the high-
est level of inequality of any region in the world. According to World Bank data, 
around half of African countries have experienced increases in income inequality in 
recent years despite reductions in poverty rates (e.g. Rwanda, Chad, and Ethiopia). 
Im port antly, rising inequality is regularly driven by income gaps between regions, 
identity groups, and urban–rural divides as well as by unequal distribution of re-
sources (including international development aid). The resulting so-called horizon-
tal inequalities are particularly politically destabilising, playing an essential role 
not only in fuelling armed conflict but also other forms of violence such as urban 
riots and terrorism (Dowd 2015). 
In addition, many African countries are confronted with the depletion of natu-
ral resources as a consequence of long-term environmental developments. Africa is 
among the parts of the world that are most vulnerable to the economic impacts of 
climate change. Given the importance of agricultural livelihoods on the continent, 
such developments can contribute to aggravating pre-existing tensions stemming 
from the political exclusion and economic marginalisation of rural communities. 
Taken together, these economic developments not only constitute an important ele-
ment of the complex causes of insecurity on the African continent, they also explain 
some of the patterns and developments of decentralised forms of violence that char-
acterise most current forms of insecurity.
Overall, Africa has become more democratic since the end of the Cold War. The 
extension of political and civil rights has been a very positive development that is 
likely to have contributed significantly to a reduction of large-scale conflict. It is 
often overlooked, however, that processes of incomplete democratisation may also 
have fuelled other forms of violence. Democratic setbacks (e.g. manipulations of 
presidential term limits) and weak governance (e.g. clientelism, corruption, and 
discriminatory policies) constitute important stability risks, as seen in Burundi 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Moreover, the introduction of 
electoral democracy coupled with weak state institutions has also nurtured more 
decentralised forms of violence. Prior research indicates that one potential reason 
lies in the fact that in a lot of countries democratisation has created a political bias 
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towards demographically strong rural areas. While the inclusion of rural elites can 
help reduce the risk of the emergence of organised rebellions, the political margin-
alisation of urban areas simultaneously increases grievances and can lead to new 
forms of political violence in urban settings (Golooba-Mutebi and Sjögren 2017). 
Finally, in many countries, democratisation has taken place in the context of highly 
centralised and weak state capacity. Weak services by the state and territories not 
effectively governed by the state are prone to being captured by non-state armed 
actors. Entangled networks of militias, terrorist organisations, and criminal organi-
sations in northern Mali and Somalia are cases in point. 
Rapid urbanisation increases the risk of unrest and support for radical organi-
sations and terrorist groups. Sub-Saharan Africa’s urbanisation rate (the share of 
people living in urban areas) has increased from less than 20 per cent in 1970 to 
nearly 40 per cent today. This trend led to an increase in the absolute number of 
urban residents by nearly 100 per cent between 1995 and 2015 alone. This demo-
graphic development has been accompanied by rising unemployment rates (par-
ticularly among the youth) and insufficient infrastructure and service provision by 
the state. Under conditions of weak governance and economic strain, rapid urbani-
sation can become a breeding ground for gang violence and riots. Poor and unequal 
educational opportunities and the socio-economic marginalisation of rural–urban 
migrants have been found to particularly increase levels of urban violence (Østby 
2016). Despite the fact that urban unrest is often considered “low-intensity,” it in-
creases the risk of fragility, which may in turn develop into a substantial security 
threat (Raleigh 2015). Moreover, individuals and groups living in urban poverty 
have been found to be at high risk of supporting terrorist organisations (Mousseau 
2011). 
The increasing number of conflict recurrences in many African countries is not 
only driven by the unaddressed economic and political issues that led to violence 
in the first place. Violence in itself begets violence by negatively affecting political 
institutions, economic development, and intercommunal relations. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that different forms of violence mutually influence each other. 
Organised crime is more likely to flourish where the state has been pushed back 
as a consequence of previous violent conflict, such as in northern Mali or in Libya. 
Exposure to violence has been found to generally increase support for radical and 
terrorist groups. For instance, individuals that have experienced high levels of vio-
lence are more likely to normalise aggressive behaviour and become more suscep-
tible to black-and-white ideologies, whereas exposure to communal violence has 
been found to increase support for violent extremism in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and 
Chad (Finkel et al. 2016). Similarly, regions in Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria that have 
experienced forms of conflict in the past have become particularly prone to Islamist 
violence. 
Devising Effective African and International Responses to 
Changing Security Challenges
Regional and international initiatives are a key route to address insecurity on the 
African continent. Concurrently, strengthening peace and security on the continent 
has been one of the main concerns of the African Union (AU). Its African Peace and 
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Security Architecture (APSA) is the primary framework for developing and imple-
menting African solutions for peace and security on the continent. In particular, the 
APSA outlines “the system (roles, instruments and procedures) by which the AU, 
the RECs [regional economic communities] as well as the RMs [regional mecha-
nisms] can realise their conflict prevention, management and resolution mandates” 
(African Union Commission 2015). However, despite notable successes, the APSA 
is ill-equipped to comprehensively deal with the various forms of conflicts and the 
multiple causes introduced above. 
The AU is seeking to strengthen the own funding of its peace activities in order 
to achieve its ambitious goal of “silencing the guns” by 2020. Consequently, the AU 
Assembly decided in 2015 to take financial responsibility for 25 per cent of the costs 
for peace activities on the African continent by 2020 (excluding the African Union 
Mission in Somalia, AMISOM). Following the recommendations of the Kaberuka 
Report (African Union 2016), the key instrument for collecting and distributing 
these funds will be the AU Peace Fund, which will serve as a financing mechanism 
for realising the AU’s goal of providing “greater investment in Mediation, Preven-
tive Diplomacy and Institutional Capacity” (African Union 2016: 7). In addition to 
bundling AU member state contributions, the Peace Fund might also be directly 
supported by the AU’s external partners, most notably the EU, which currently 
(2016) covers 98 per cent of the costs of AU peace initiatives. 
However, raising funds and creating new funding procedures is just one of 
the challenges that need to be addressed to devise more effective responses to in-
security on the African continent. One key imbalance that has prevented African 
institutions and their international partners from more effectively addressing the 
key causes and new forms of insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is the APSA’s focus 
on military responses to escalated conflicts over sustainable peacebuilding. Most 
importantly, the ASPA does not focus on addressing the underlying causes of the 
above-described economic, political, and social tensions. Moreover, the primary 
APSA instruments in this area (most notably, peacekeeping and mediation) have 
been designed with the objective of countering instances of large-scale organised 
violence such as armed conflicts or civil wars. While this specific form of violence 
continues to be an important threat to peace and stability on the continent, more 
decentralised and low-level forms of violence dominate now. Thus the main ele-
ments of the APSA, such as early warnings and international interventions, are less 
suited to addressing these types of violence. 
As outlined, “new” threats such as terrorism and violent extremism characterise 
insecurity on the African continent. In response to these challenges, the APSA and 
the AU’s international partners should rebalance their approach to systematically 
strengthen the development–security nexus. This requires implementing more-
comprehensive conflict-prevention and peacebuilding strategies to help reduce the 
multiplicity of conflict drivers and increase societal and political resilience against 
security threats. Strengthening conflict prevention and peacebuilding requires that 
the AU member states and the AU Commission take the structural drivers of inse-
curity (such as low and unequal development) more systematically into account in 
the framework of the APSA. This does not necessarily entail greater responsibility 
for peacebuilding and development on the part of individual organisations, most 
notably the AU; it does, however, necessitate a better coordination and joint pro-
gramming between the actors involved in both areas.
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The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 concurrently declares conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding to be two of its five strategic priorities (the others being crisis/conflict 
management, strategic security issues and coordination and partnerships) (African 
Union Commission 2015: 22). Despite their prioritisation, peacebuilding and struc-
tural conflict prevention remain the weakest element of the APSA. Moving away 
from the often “emergency-driven approach” requires more attention to preventive 
action that contributes to the de-escalation of conflicts at an early stage – for ex-
ample, targeted development interventions, sanctions, [2] and elections monitoring.
This would require the APSA and its international supporters to more effec-
tively bring together various conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and 
integrate them into related development activities in a comprehensive framework. 
Such an approach would also contribute to overcoming the classic compartmentali-
sation of support according to the traditional “conflict cycle,” which differentiates 
between conflict prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding efforts but 
no longer reflects the reality of an increasing number of conflict recurrences or the 
diversity of conflict types and their causes. Instead, support should be structured 
along the lines of key priority areas such as economic reconstruction that addresses 
inequality and deprivation of the youth and political reform that focuses on govern-
ance-related causes of conflict independently of specific conflict phases. This would 
serve to more effectively tackle the structural causes of varied forms of insecurity 
on the African continent. 
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